

Message Text

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 STATE 200308

11

ORIGIN SS-30

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /031 R

66616

DRAFTED BY/ EUR/RPM RFROWICK

APPROVED BY/ EUR RPM EJSTREATOR

EUR/JROUSE S/S-O GTWOHIE

----- 115970

P 120137Z SEP 74

FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO USMISSION NATO PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 200308

STADIS////////////////////////////////////

EXDIS

FOLLOWINGREPEAT GENEVA 5706 ACTION TO SECSTATE INFO PRAGUE OF
10 SEP 74 QUOTE

PRAGUE FOR AMBASSADOR SHERER

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR

SUBJ: CSCE: STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR SHERER

AT SEPTEMBER 13 NAC

1. WE SUBMIT BELOW USDEL CSCE'S DRAFT OF AN OPENING STATE-
MENT FOR USE BY AMBASSADOR SHERER AT SEPTEMBER 13 NAC
DISCUSSION. FINAL VERSION AS APPROVED BY DEPARTMENT
SHOULD BE TRANSMITTED DIRECTLY TO USNATO TO BE AVAILABLE,
IF POSSIBLE, FOR AMBASSADOR SHERER WHEN HE ARRIVES THURSDAY
P.M. JUNE 12.#

2. IN DRAFTING FOLLOWING TEXT, WE HAVE ASSUMED THAT FRENCH
REP WILL OPEN NAC MEETING BY INTRODUCING NEW EC-NINE PAPER
WHICH HAS JUST BEEN SHOWN TO US HERE (SEPTTEL).

3. OUR DRAFT STATEMENT PROPOSES THAT NATO BASKET III CAUCUS
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 STATE 200308

IN GENEVA SHOULD DEVELOP IN NEAR FUTURE TEXTUAL

FORMULATIONS COVERING ESSENTIAL BASKET III ELEMENTS, WORKING FROM NEW EC-9 LANGUAGE THAT WILL BE INTRODUCED IN GENEVA IN NEXT FEW DAYS, AS WELL AS FROM FOUR TEXTS WHICH WE SUBMITTED IN JULY. WE HAVE AVOIDED, HOWEVER, THE MORE CONTENTIOUS ISSUE OF WHAT SHOULD BE DONE WITH AGREED ALLIED TEXTS AFTER THEY HAVE BEEN DEVELOPED. THE NINE REMAIN OPPOSED TO THEIR EARLY PRESENTATION TO THE SOVIETS AS A PACKAGE AND PREFER TO SURFACE THEM SERIATIM DURING THE COURSE OF FIRST READING OF ALL BASKET III TEXTS. WE BELIEVE THIS MATTER CAN BE LEFT ASIDE FOR TIME BEING, WHILE WE CONCENTRATE OUR EFFORTS ON DRAFTING OF NEW TEXTS.

4. BEGIN TEXT. MR. CHAIRMAN, ONCE AGAIN I WOULD LIKE TO EXPRESS OUR SATISFACTION ON HAVING THIS OPPORTUNITY TO DISCUSS CSCE IN THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL, AS WELL AS OUR GRATITUDE FOR THE INTEREST WITH WHICH NATO CONTINUES TO FOLLOW DEVELOPMENTS AT THE CONFERENCE AND FOR THE CARE WITH WHICH THIS MEETING HAS BEEN PREPARED. WE ARE PARTICULARLY APPRECIATIVE OF THE WORK WHICH THE POLADS AND THE INTERNATIONAL STAFF HAVE ACCOMPLISHED WITH REGARD TO CBMS DURING THE NORMALLY QUIET MONTH OF AUGUST, AND I WOULD ALSO LIKE TO THANK THE NICE FOR PROVIDING US WITH THEIR NEW PAPER ON CSCE, WHICH WE WILL CERTAINLY STUDY WITH GREAT INTEREST.

5. THE VERY FACT THAT WE MEET HERE TODAY SERVES TO UNDERLINE THE BASIC UNITY OF PURPOSE WHICH ALL OUR COUNTRIES SHARE IN CSCE, AND THE SIMILARITY OF OUR OBJECTIVES IN THIS AND OTHER UNDERTAKINGS WHICH WE ALL HOPE WILL BRING US CLOSER TO A REAL AND LASTING DETENTE. IF OUR IDEAS ON TACTICS MAY DIFFER SOMEWHAT I HOPE WE CAN ALL KEEP IN MIND THIS UNDERLYING REALITY.

6. MR. CHAIRMAN, WE FEEL THAT THE WORK WHICH HAS BEEN ACCOMPLISHED OVER THE SUMMER HAS SHOWN THAT IT IS POSSIBLE FOR US TO COME CLOSE TO AGREED POSITIONS ON ONE OF THE MOST IMPORTANT ASPECTS OF CSCE. THE POLADS REPORT ON CBMS IS NOT, I THINK, A PERFECT DOCUMENT. WE STILL DIFFER FOR EXAMPLE ON HOW TO HANDLE THE MOVEMENTS ISSUE, AND WE FOR OUR PART, WOULD HAVE PREFERRED TO NARROW THE RANGE

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 STATE 200308

OF VIEWS ON PROPER LEVEL OF THE THRESHOLD FOR PRIOR NOTIFICATION OF MANEUVERS. WE ALSO WOULD HAVE PREFERRED, AS YOU KNOW, TO SET OUT EXPLICITLY WHAT WE TAKE TO BE THE TACIT ALLIED CONSENSUS ON SOME OF THE OTHER CBM ISSUES. THAT BEING SAID, WE CAN ACCEPT THE POLADS REPORT AS IT STANDS, IT IS NOT FULLY AGREED, BUT IT DOES GIVE US A BETTER BASIS FOR PURSUING THE CBM NEGOTIATIONS IN GENEVA.

7. WE ALSO FEEL THERE IS ALREADY A LARGE MEASURE OF AGREEMENT AMONG US IN THE AREAS OF PRINCIPLES AND BASKET II.

8. WHAT WE SHOULD NOW CONCENTRATE ON, THEREFORE, IS THE QUESTION OF WHAT WILL CONSTITUTE A SATISFACTORY CONTENT FOR BASKET III. WE ALL CERTAINLY AGREE ON THE IMPORTANCE OF BASKET III. WE ALL WANT TO ACHIEVE SOME USEFUL AND POSITIVE RESULTS IN THIS AREA. BASKET III IS AN EXPRESSION OF BASIC WESTERN VALUES, AND WE SHOULD DEFEND THEM. BUT WE ALSO FEEL THE ALLIES SHOULD BE REALISTIC ABOUT THE LIMITS OF THE POSSIBLE.

9. THERE HAVE BEEN SOME DIFFERENCES BETWEEN US IN THE PAST ON HOW, AS A PRACTICAL MATTER, WE SHOULD GO ABOUT REACHING THE LIMITS OF WHAT IS POSSIBLE IN BASKET III. PERHAPS THOSE DIFFERENCES ARE NARROWING. IN ANY CASE WE WELCOME MOST WARMLY THE RECENT SUGGESTIONS PUT FORWARD BY THE NINE FOR TABLING IN GENEVA A NEW VERSION OF EXISTING BASKET III TEXTS. WE ALSO WELCOME THE PROPOSALS FOR MORE FLEXIBLE WORK METHODS ON BASKET III ISSUES.

10. IN APPROACHING BASKET III AT GENEVA, WE CAN EITHER ADOPT OPENING POSITIONS THAT REFLECT OUR MAXIMUM HOPES, OR WE CAN BEGIN WITH PROPOSALS SOMEWHAT CLOSER TO WHAT WE EXPECT WILL EMERGE IN THE END. WHETHER WE START FROM MAXIMAL POSITIONS OR MORE REALISTIC ONES, IT IS MY GOVERNMENT'S CANDID OPINION THAT THE FINAL BASKET III OUTCOME WILL NOT, IN THE END, BE VERY DIFFERENT. BUT THE MAXIMAL APPROACH, IN OUR VIEW, HAS THE DISTINCT DISADVANTAGE OR RISKING AN ACRIMONIOUS DEBATE OVER BASKET III THAT WILL INEVITABLY BECOME PUBLIC TO SOME EXTENT. THIS IN TURN COULD STIFFEN POSITIONS ON BOTH SIDES. IT COULD
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 STATE 200308

EVENTUALLY LEAVE WESTERN GOVERNMENTS WITH THE UNPALATABLE CHOICE BETWEEN BACKING DOWN MORE OR LESS PUBLICLY, OR OF PUTTING AT RISK THE BROADER PROCESS OF DETENTE IN WHICH ALL OF US HAVE A CONSIDERABLE STAKE.

PRAGUE FOR AMBASSADOR SHERER

11. WE CAN REDUCE THESE RISKS BY OPENING WITH PROPOSALS THAT ARE SOMEWHAT NEARER TO OUR ULTIMATE GOALS. I DO NOT MEAN THAT WE SHOULD TRIM ALL THE FAT FROM OUR PROPOSALS BEFORE THEY ARE TABLED. OBVIOUSLY THIS WOULD BE A FOOLISH NEGOTIATING TACTIC. BUT SOMEWHAT LEANER OPENING PROPOSALS, CLOSER TO THE LIKELY SHAPE OF THE FINAL COMPROMISES, WOULD GIVE THE OTHER SIDE A CLEARER IDEA OF THE CONCESSIONS THAT WILL BE REQUIRED IF THERE IS TO BE A SUMMIT

LEVEL CONCLUSION OF CSCE. THESE MORE MODEST TEXTS WOULD ALSO HELP TO LESSEN THE DANGER THAT THE GENEVA DEBATE OVER BASKET III MAY SPOIL THE GENERAL CLIMATE OF EAST-WEST RELATIONS. HOWEVER, THESE LESS AMBITIOUS INITIAL PROPOSALS WOULD NOT MEAN, IN OUR VIEW, THAT WE ARE LOWERING OUR SIGHTS ABOUT WHAT IS ULTIMATELY ATTAINABLE IN BASKET III.

12. IT WAS WITH ALL OF THIS IN MIND THAT WE PUT FORWARD IN JULY FOUR SPECIFIC TEXTS ON BASKET III ISSUES FOR GOVERNMENTS TO REFLECT UPON OVER THE SUMMER. WE NOW VERY MUCH HOPE TO HAVE YOUR VIEWS ON THESE TEXTS AND ALSO ON WHAT YOU WOULD REGARD AS A SATISFACTORY OUTCOME ON OTHER KEY BASKET III ISSUES. WE RECOGNIZE THAT WE HAVE COME TO AGREED POSITIONS ON MANY OF THESE TOPICS BEFORE IN NATO. BUT WHAT HAS TAKEN PLACE IN GENEVA IN THE LASTT YEAR HAS GIVEN US SOME NEW INSIGHTS ON CSCE, AND WE CONTINUE TO FEEL THAT A RE-EXAMINATION OF THE SUBJECT IS QUITE APPROPRIATE NOW.

13. IT ALSO REMAINS THE HOPE OF MY GOVERNMENT THAT THE PRODUCT OF THIS RE-EXAMINATION WILL BE THE EARLY DEVELOPMENT OF ACTUAL TEXTUAL FORMULATIONS, AGREED AMONG THE ALLIES, ON THE CENTRAL BASKET III ISSUES.

14. I SHOULD ADD THAT WE HAVE NO FIXED VIEWS ON THE BEST PROCEDURES FOR FURTHER STEPS IN THIS EXERCISE. MY UNDER-CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 05 STATE 200308

STANDING OF THE NINE PAPER IS THAT THE NATO BASKET III CAUCUS IN GENEVA WILL EXAMINE, IN THE LIGHT OF OUR DISCUSSION TODAY, THE NEW TEXTS THAT WILL BE PREPARED THERE BY THE NINE, AS WELL AS THE FOUR TEXTS SUBMITTED EARLIER BY MY GOVERNMENT, AND ATTEMPT TO REACH CONSENSUS. WE AGREE THAT THIS WOULD BE A USEFUL FIRST STEP. ONCE THESE PAPERS HAVE BEEN DRAFTED IN GENEVA, WE WOULD HOPE THAT THEY COULD THEN BE REVIEWED IN THE NAC. IF SOME OF YOU HAVE OTHER PROCEDURAL SUGGESTIONS, WE WILL LISTEN TO THEM WITH AN OPEN MIND. THE IMPORTANT THING, I BELIEVE, IS TO CARRY THIS EFFORT FORWARD AS PROMPTLY AS POSSIBLE. THANK YOU, MR. CHAIRMAN, END TEXT. DALE
T
UNQUOTE KISSINGER

CONFIDENTIAL

NNN

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: Z
Capture Date: 01 JAN 1994
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: TEXT, SPEECHES, FOREIGN POLICY POSITION, GUIDANCE INSTRUCTIONS, MEETINGS
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 12 SEP 1974
Decaption Date: 28 MAY 2004
Decaption Note: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Authority: golinofr
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 28 MAY 2004
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1974STATE200308
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: EUR/RPM RFROWICK
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: GS
Errors: N/A
Film Number: D740254-0632
From: STATE
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1974/newtext/t19740951/aaaabrdg.tel
Line Count: 215
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM
Office: ORIGIN SS
Original Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Original Handling Restrictions: STADIS
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 4
Previous Channel Indicators:
Previous Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Previous Handling Restrictions: STADIS
Reference: n/a
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Authority: golinofr
Review Comment: n/a
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 03 APR 2002
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review History: RELEASED <03 APR 2002 by collinp0>; APPROVED <02 JUL 2002 by golinofr>
Review Markings:

Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
30 JUN 2005

Review Media Identifier:
Review Referrals: n/a
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: CSCE: STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR SHERER AT SEPTEMBER 13 NAC
TAGS: PFOR, CSCE, (SHERER)
To: NATO BRUSSELS
Type: TE
Markings: Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 30 JUN 2005